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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DOE v. SWANK
On November 30, 1970, Ms. Jane Doe1 telephoned her caseworker
at the Cook County Department of Public Aid to request that public as-
sistance be furnished to her new born baby son, Kumasi-Chad. Ms. Doe's
caseworker asked her all the questions necessary to add the child to the
family's AFDC grant. The caseworker also inquired as to the name of
the child's father, his address, and place of employment, all according
to Illinois Department of Public Aid policy, 2 explaining that the infor-
mation was required in order for the baby to be added to the monthly
grant. Ms. Doe refused to supply any information concerning the father
of Kumasi-Chad. At this point the Department sent her a letter8 advising
1. Because of the special circumstances of this case, the plaintiff sued under a
fictitious name.
2. ILL. DEP'T OF PUBLIC AID, CATEGORICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL (hereinafter
cited as MANUAL) § 1259.1 (1969), provides in part that: "As a condition of initial
or continuing eligibility, the Illinois Public Aid Code provides the parent or other
person having custody of a child on whose behalf he is applying for or receiving
ADC/ADC-U . . . must request the Attorney General (State's Attorney for Cook
County) file action for enforcement of such remedies as the law provides for fulfill-
ment of the support obligation of the absent parent of such child. Absent parent
includes the legal parent or father of a child born out of wedlock, whether or not
his paternity has been legally established.
Action is required when the absent parent is failing to furnish support, is not
meeting the terms of a court order, is financially able to furnish more support
than ordered or agreed to, or is not legally determined to be the father of a child
born out of wedlock. The parent or other person having custody of the child who
has the right to file a support action must cooperate in every material aspect of any
legal enforcement procedure, including the signing of such legal documents as
may be required and the giving of necessary testimony. ...
Unwillingness to sign DPA 440 or to fully cooperate in the legal procedure imme-
diately renders all children owed a duty of support ineligible for assistance. In-
eligibility continues until the Statute of Limitations has expired in paternity cases.
Generally this is a two year period. However, legal acknowledgment of paternity
or absence of the putative father from the state stops the statute from running,
thereby extending the period of ineligibility. . ..
Failure or refusal of the mother of a child to cooperate will not affect the
eligibility of any other children in the family nor of the mother if she is the grantee
for the children and/or is caring for them .... "
3. Form DPA 157 is sent to all recipients whose assistance is decreased in any
way or cancelled. It contains a short explanation of the change in the recipient's
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her that failure to disclose the father's name and address would make
her ineligible for assistance. In addition, the note informed her that her
rent and utilities would be pro-rated so that her grant would include only
a 3/4 share, excluding the 1/4 share for Kumasi, effective December
1970.
4
Ms. Doe requested a "fair hearing" 5 at her local district office, where
she was again refused aid for Kumasi on the grounds that she had re-
fused to divulge any information concerning the baby's father. She ap-
pealed that ruling at an administrative hearing held at the central adminis-
trave office of the county department. The appeals officer upheld the
action of the county department in its refusal to grant aid to the family
for Kumasi-Chad. 6
Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Ms. Doe went to the
federal district court, seeking an injunction prohibiting the department
from enforcing the Illinois Public Aid Manual provisions,7 which re-
quired her to divulge the name of Kumasi's father or suffer a reduc-
tion of AFDC benefits. Ms. Doe's complaint was in the form of a class ac-
tion,8 and was based on the fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution, the Social Security Act,9 and the Civil
Rights Act. 10 The plaintiffs sought declaratory and permanent injunc-
tive relief, as well as temporary relief and release of benefits wrongfully
withheld.
Since the injunction sought the restraining of the enforcement and
monthly grant, the reason for the change, and informs the client that he has fifteen
days in which to contact the district office if there is any reason why he believes
that his grant should not be cut. The form also contains a statement of the client's
right to appeal. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Note, Constitutional
Law-Due Process-Evidentiary Hearing Required Prior to Termination of Welfare
Benefits, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 552 (1970).
4. MANUAL § 1504 provides that in the event there is an ineligible member ot
the family living at home, the family's rental allowance is decreased proportion-
ately.
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (1964); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
6. The right to appeal decisions of the Department to terminate or decrease a
recipient's public assistance grant is provided for in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-8
(1969). However, it is important to note that the appeals officer has only limited
power to decide a case-he is bound by relevant rules and regulations of the De-
partment.
7. MANUAL § 408.3 was superceded by § 1259.1 promulgated on Oct. 28, 1969.
See note 2 supra.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 401 et. seq. (1970).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). See Note, Federal Judicial Review of State
Welfare Practices, 67 COL. L. REV. 84 (1967).
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operation of a state-wide regulation on the grounds of its unconstitution-
ality, a three-judge panel was requested. The three-judge panel (Maro-
vitz, J., dissenting), relying on a similar case decided in a Connecticut
district court," ruled that:
refusal to extend benefits in the circumstances recounted here is contrary to con-
gressional intent. Accordingly we hold that the challenged provisions of the Illi-
nois Department of Public Aid Categorical Assistance Manual are void and un-
enforceable. 12
The court further ordered the defendants to communicate to anyone
denied aid under those provisions that they were now eligible for assist-
ance, and to compute the amount of aid wrongfully withheld from each of
them, and to remit such amounts to them. Jane Doe v. Swank, 332 F.
Supp. 61 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
The defendants, Edward T. Weaver (successor to Harold 0. Swank),
Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid, and David L. Daniel, Di-
rector, Cook County Department of Public Aid, appealed the decision
directly to the Supreme Court,' 3 which affirmed in a per curiam decision. 14
The effect of this decision is that Illinois is permanently enjoined from
making the cooperation of an AFDC mother, in gaining support from a
legally responsible, deserting father, a condition of eligibility for receipt of
welfare benefits.
The purpose of this casenote is to trace the origins and development of
the Notice to Law Enforcement Officials provisions (hereinafter re-
ferred to as NOLEO provisions) of the Social Security Act,' 5 examine its
implementation by the Illinois Department of Public Aid until the Doe de-
cision, discuss questions of constitutional magnitude raised by the plaintiff
but avoided by the court, and finally, to attempt to outline the dilemma
that Illinois and other states now find themselves in when attempting to
reduce welfare payments by securing support from legally responsible
relatives. In analyzing this decision it will be made abundantly clear that
the Supreme Court's affirmance of the order to void the Illinois NOLEO
11. Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed as
improperly filed, 396 U.S. 488, rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 970 (1970).
12. 332 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. I11. 1971).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law,
any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying,
after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil ac-
tion, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined
by a district court of three judges." See Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 382 U.S. 423, 428 (1966); Florida Lime and Avocado
Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960).
14. Aff'd sub nom., Doe v. Weaver, 404 U.S. 987 (1971).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(17) (1967).
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provision will have a lasting effect on welfare law and administration,
especially in light of the state program's precarious financial condition."6
The Social Security Act provides for assistance to four major cate-
gories of needy people: the blind,1 7 the aged,18 the disabled19 and
dependent children (AFDC) .20 The states administer each program, set-
ting up their own criteria of eligibility, administrative procedures and
standards of assistance. These must be approved by the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, 21 who bases his evaluation of each in-
dividual state program on certain basic requirements provided for in the
Act, 22 as well as on regulations imposed by HEW. If the state receives ap-
proval of its program, it is eligible for a grant-in-aid from the federal
government to defray the major portion of the cost of the program. A
state whose program does not receive approval has an opportunity to
plead its case at a conformity hearing. If the Secretary is still not
satisfied, the state then has the choice of either changing the program to
bring it into conformity or to receive no federal matching funds.23 It is
important to note that federal funds have never been withheld from a state
for failure to comply with the guidelines set up by HEW and the Social
Security Act. The threat of this drastic measure has been enough, in the
past, to bring the states into conformity.
One federal provision required of all participating states is the No-
tice to Law Enforcement Officials provision. This provision first appeared
in the 1951 amendments to the Social Security Act as part of a bill in-
troduced by Rep. Thomas Steed of Oklahoma. The bill, as originally intro-
duced, would have made desertion of a child a federal crime; 24 however,
the criminal provisions were deleted, leaving only the "notice require-
ment." The bill was adopted and passed by Congress and provided
that:
16. See County of Cook v. Ogilvie, 50 Il1. 2d 379, 280 N.E.2d 224 (1972).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-06 (1964).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (1964).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-55 (1964).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (1964).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964). See also BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN
(1965); Wedemeyer and Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv.
326, 342 (1966).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 604 (Supp. III, 1967).
23. See BELL, supra note 23 at 137-51. LEYENDECKER, PROBLEMS AND POLICY
IN PUBLIC ASSISTANCE (1955); Note, Welfare's Condition X, 76 YALE L.J. 1222
(1967).
24. H.R. 4057, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); see also HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, MAKING ABANDONMENT OF DEPENDENTS A FEDERAL CRIME, H.R. Ser.
No. 23, 81st Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. (1950).
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A state plan for aid and services to needy families with dependent children must
provide for prompt notice to law enforcement officials of the state furnishing aid to
families with dependent children in respect of a child who has been abandoned or
deserted by a parent. 2 5
This amendment placed an additional burden on the states without setting
up any procedures for cooperation between welfare departments and
law enforcement officials of different states. Congress also failed to take
into consideration the fact that it did not make available any additional
matching funds to states in order to fulfill the requirement. The meas-
ure, originally a criminal statute and later a considerably weakened no-
tice requirement, was a dismal failure in terms of securing additional sup-
port from deserting parents.
The 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act, while adding several
sections regarding NOLEO, 26 made the 1951 provisions more explicit by
authorizing each state to establish the paternity of each child born out
of wedlock who is receiving AFDC. Congress was attempting to buttress
the NOLEO provisions of 1951, which had languished in impotency with-
out any supportive procedures or funding. The 1967 amendments re-
quired each state to staff a centralized support enforcement agency and,
more importantly, provided the states with matching funds to defray the
additional administrative costs. The amendments authorized the imple-
mentation of interstate machinery to enforce support obligations of ab-
sconding fathers-and all other legally responsible relatives. The new
amendments27 allowed state enforcement officials access to the files of the
Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration in order
to obtain the address of a deserting parent-certainly an unprecedented
step forward in ease of enforcement. In short, the 1967 additions to
the NOLEO provisions of the Social Security Act gave the 1951 require-
ment procedural "teeth" to aid state officials in the enforcement of a sup-
port obligation across state lines. 28
25. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(17) (1951).
26. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821,
amending 42 U.S.C. § 400-800.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 610(a) (1967) provides: "Upon receiving a report from a
State agency made pursuant to Section 602(a)(21) of this title, the Secretary shall
furnish to the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate the names and social se-
curity account numbers of the parents contained in such report. . . . The Secre-
tary of the Treasury or his delegate shall endeavor to ascertain the address of each
such parent from the master files of the Internal Revenue Service, and shall fur-
nish any address so ascertained to the State agency which submitted such report."
28. The pertinent portions of the 1967 additions to the NOLEO provisions of
the Social Security Act are:
"402(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy children must provide-(A)
for the development and implementation of a program under which the State
CASE NOTES
The regulations issued by HEW regarding the implementation of the
NOLEO legislation of 1951 make it clear that the agency considered the
amendment a purely reporting requirement and that the agency did not
interpret it as adding an additional eligibility requirement:
[The amendment does not] make the assistance agency responsible for requir-
ing the applicant to take action against the deserting parent or for making eligibility
for assistance conditional upon action by the applicant ...
The public assistance job is seen as that of providing eligible children with the
assistance they need; and it is not the intent of the legislation to deprive needy chil-
dren of assistance in order to punish their parents for neglect of their duties. Al-
though accepting assistance involves notice to the law enforcement officials if a
parent has deserted or abandoned his child, the amendment does not impose an addi-
tional eligibility requirement. . . . [Tihe provision . . . requires notice that aid
has been furnished "in respect of a child who has been deserted or abandoned by
his parent."2 9
HEW apparently based its interpretation on the remarks of Rep. Steed,
the original author of the bill, who stated:
In introducing this bill, I did not intend that aid should be withheld from any
needy child, but rather this bill is aimed at parents, who without justification,
shift the financial responsibility for their children to the federal, state, and local
governmentsa 0
The HEW regulations suggest that the agency inferred that Congress in-
tended that desertion of a child should no longer be known only to the wel-
fare agency, but that the state agency should communicate that fact to
law enforcement officials, who would then take legal action against the
deserting parent. The HEW regulations in no way suggest that the
state agency could deny assistance to a mother who would refuse to
agency will undertake (i) in the case of a child born out of wedlock who is receiv-
ing aid to families with dependent children, to establish the paternity of such
child and secure support for him, and (ii) in the case of any child receiving such
aid who has been deserted or abandoned by his parent, to secure support for such
child from such parent (or from any other person legally liable for such support),
utilizing any reciprocal arrangements adopted with other States to obtain or enforce
court orders of support ...... See REVISED UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT
OF SUPPORT ACT, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 101-42 (1971), which is now in force
in one form or another in all states, according to the Handbook of the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws at 223 (1969). For a criti-
cism of existing law see Bell, Relative Responsibility: A Problem in Social Policy,
12 SOCIAL WORK 32 (1967); Note, The Un-uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, 9 J. FAM. L. 325 (1969).
29. HEW, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, pt. IV § 8120
(1970) (hereinafter cited as HArDBOOK).
30. House Ways and Means Committee Hearings on H.R. 2893, pt. 2, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., 1949 (remarks of Rep. Steed). See also 95 CONG. REC. 13953
(1949).
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cooperate with the NOLEO requirement of identifying and attempting
to locate the father.
In most instances, States should be able, without changes in State laws, to carry out
this requirement of the Federal act by issuing the necessary rules and regulations.
The Bureau advises against legislation that makes the actual commencement of an
action on the part of a parent to obtain support from the parent who has deserted
or abandoned his children a condition of eligibility. Such provisions deprive
needy children, who would otherwise be eligible, of the right to receive aid to de-
pendent children pending the commencement of an action to obtain support from
the absent parent. 31
Since HEW has no actual power to direct state welfare legislation, this
"advice" left states free to enact any legislation that they pleased re-
garding the NOLEO requirement. One must keep in mind that HEW's
only sanction against arbitrary or illegal state action is to refuse to ap-
prove the state plan.3 2  This procedure involves a type of administrative
overkill, which results in the cut-off of all federal matching funds-cer-
tainly a drastic result since it would leave all the welfare recipients of
the state without any assistance. This inability of HEW to intervene in
situations where the states adopt rules which are inconsistent with its own
regulations or the Social Security Act is one of the most glaring faults
of national welfare administration.33
HEW never abandoned its original interpretation of the NOLEO legis-
lation; and in 1967, when Congress amended the requirement, HEW
promulgated regulations consistent with its earlier interpretation of
NOLEO. HEW again interpreted the NOLEO requirement, including the
31. HANDBOOK § 8149.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1964). See also Comment, Intervention in HEW Con-formity Proceedings, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. Lm. L. REv. 559 (1971).
33. See Wedemeyer and Moore, supra note 21. Since HEW was hesitant to
call for conformity hearings unless the state plan was flagrantly outside the bounds of
statutory intent, the states had carte blanche to put restrictive conditions on the
receipt of public assistance. People on welfare normally have no money with
which to pay lawyers, and so, even in cases where states had terminated or refused
assistance under unconstitutional provisions, the state program went unchallenged.
HEW would get a state to conform, but a poor person cannot wait six months or
even six weeks for the necessities of life. However since the 1967 amendments to
the enabling legislation for the Office of Economic Opportunity 42 U.S.C. § 2992(1967), federal funds have been provided for legal services for persons meet-
ing certain poverty standards. (See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEws 2451(1967)). With legal assistance provided them, poor persons have been asserting
their rights and challenging various state welfare provisions. There has literally
been a flood of welfare litigation since 1967. See, e.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404
U.S. 282 (1971); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). Congress has reacted by
taking preliminary steps to forbid the use of federal funds for salaries of lawyers
who file court challenges of federal welfare laws and policies.
250 [Vol. XXII
CASE NOTES
1967 amendments, to be a pure reporting device, which was solely the
responsibility of the state-and that the state could not require the cooper-
ation of welfare recipients in order to fulfill its own statutory obligation.
HEW apparently considered the 1967 changes as procedural and not sub-
stantive in nature. In January, 1969, HEW promulgated regulations with
regard to the 1967 amendments:
(a) There must be a program for establishing paternity for children born out-of-
wedlock and for securing financial support for them and for all other children re-
ceiving AFDC who have been deserted by their parents or other legally responsible
relatives. Efforts must be made to locate putative and absent parents and there
must be a determination of their potential to provide financial support. There
must be provisions for the utilization of reciprocal arrangements with other States
to obtain or enforce court orders for support. There must be a single staff unit in
the State agency and in large local agencies to administer this program. (The files of
the Social Security Administration are available to the State agencies when other
efforts have failed to provide the necessary information on the address of a par-
ent.)34
The reason that HEW persisted in its original interpretation of the
NOLEO requirement, even in the face of the extraordinary measures
authorized by Congress to secure support for AFDC children, apparently
stems from remarks made by Rep. Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee, and the author of the 1967 legislation.
To judge from his statements, it was not the intent of Congress to make
parental cooperation under the NOLEO requirement a condition of eligi-
bility:
Are you satisfied with the fact that illegitimacy in this country is rising . . .? 1
am not. We have tried to encourage the States to develop programs to do something
about it. Now we are requiring them to do something about it. We are not penaliz-
ing any child. We are not going to take a child off the rolls in any State nor fail to
participate with Federal funds in the care of that child, regardless of what his par-
ent does.3 5
This is strong language and certainly supportive of the HEW position-
yet Ms. Doe's son, Kumasi, was refused assistance by CCDPA based
upon her refusal to name her son's father. The Department's interpre-
tation of the NOLEO requirement differed significantly from that of
HEW.
The Illinois Department of Public Aid and the Illinois legislature have
never agreed with the HEW interpretation of the NOLEO requirement
as a purely reporting provision. They have consistently interpreted
NOLEO as a mandate from Congress to see that support obligations are
34. 45 C.F.R. § 220.48; 34 Fed. Reg. 1359 (1969).
35. 113 Cong. Rec. 23053 (1967).
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enforced in light of the state's legitimate interest in reducing welfare costs.36
The Illinois Department promulgated the following Manual provisions
according to its interpretation of the NOLEO requirement:
Federal law requires the Department to give prompt notice to law enforcement offi-
cials when aid is furnished a child who has been deserted or abandoned by a parent.
Therefore, when a needy child has been deserted or abandoned by parent(s) the ap-
plicant for assistance for that child must consent to the desertion or abandonment
being reported to the proper law enforcement official. . .. 37
As a condition of initial or continuing eligibility, the Illinois Public Aid Code
provides the parent or other person having custody of a child on whose behalf he
is applying for or receiving ADC/ADC-U or MANG (Cr) (Cu) must request the
Attorney General (State's Attorney for Cook County) file action for enforcement
of such remedies as the law provides for fulfillment of the support obligation of
the absent parent of such child . 8... 3
It would seem that the views of HEW and the Department were dia-
metrically opposed regarding the question of whether the NOLEO require-
ment could be used by the states as a condition of eligibility. The De-
partment insisted that, considered in the context of the entire Social
Security Act, the NOLEO requirement not only authorized the states to
report desertion or abandonment, but delegated to them a positive duty
to gain support for needy children. The Department's argument is cer-
tainly plausible--or else why would Congress have required the states to
establish programs designed to determine the paternity of illegitimate chil-
dren? Why would it have authorized the expense of a separate administra-
tive unit within each state agency to be operated in cooperation with courts
and law enforcement agencies? Why had Congress authorized the unprec-
edented step of allowing this new state unit the use of IRS and Social
Security Administration files? And, since Congress had not specifically
forbidden the use of NOLEO as a condition of eligibility, the Illinois
Department felt that it was well within the guidelines of the Social Security
Act in interpreting the requirement in the manner in which it did.3 9
Ms. Doe refused to cooperate with Illinois law enforcement officials
who were seeking to gain support from Kumasi's father. The Depart-
ment, however, made her cooperation in fulfilling the NOLEO reporting
36. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1971).
37. MANUAL § 1255.
38. MANUAL § 1259.1. ADC-U is the unemployed father sector of the AFDC
program, authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1967). MANG (Cr)(Cu) is the medi-
caide program authorized under 42 U.S.C. 1396 (1967).
39. ILL. DP'T OF PUBLIc Am, ILL. PUBLIC Am CODE § 2-11 (1969) defines
"the spouse of an applicant or recipient; the parent or parents of a child who is
under age 21" as legally responsible relatives. Cf. U.R.E.S.A., supra, note 28;
Woods v. Miller, 318 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
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requirement a condition of eligibility for her son, even though the HEW
guidelines clearly stated that NOLEO was not to be construed as a condi-
tion of eligibility by the states. HEW was hesitant to hold conformity
hearings and threaten Illinois, and the many other states who interpreted
the NOLEO requirement as a condition of eligibility, with termination
of federal grants-in-aid. 40  Ms. Doe, therefore, brought a class action suit
in federal district court to enjoin the Department from enforcing the pro-
vision. She based her suit on several theories, the most important of
which were: (1) that the NOLEO provision, to the extent that it is used
as a condition of eligibility, is inconsistent with the Social Security Act, and
(2) that the NOLEO provision, as it is used by the Illinois Department,
violates a welfare mother's constitutional right against self-incrimination
and the right to preserve the integrity of her family.
The federal district court found that the constitutional claims of Ms.
Doe raised substantial issues and that the three-judge panel was properly
convened, but the court did not decide the suit on constitutional grounds.
Following another three-judge federal district court in Connecticut, 41 it
construed the Illinois NOLEO requirement as an unauthorized condition
of eligibility. Judge Lynch, speaking for the majority, stated:
We find nothing in the Social Security Act that permits the state to attempt to satisfy
its affirmative duty to seek support for the child by cutting that child off from
AFDC. We agree with the majority in Doe v. Shapiro . . . in holding that re-
40. Cf. KY. REv. STAT. 225.200(4), as amended (1970): "No assistance
under this chapter shall be paid on behalf of a child born out of wedlock until
after a paternity proceeding involving the child has been commenced."; See also
62 PA. STATS. ANN. 1973 (Purdon, 1968): "3237.14 . . . If the person decides to
take court action against a legally responsible relative, assistance is continued until
the court makes a decision. . . . If the person refuses to take court action, as-
sistance is discontinued for those members of the assistance unit for whom the
relative is legally responsible." 3237.15 Court Action. Court action is an eligi-
bility requirement for assistance . . . ; See also CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 11477
(West 1970). For an example of how a welfare recipient's right to privacy is
respected in some states, see N.M. HEALTH AND SOC. SERVicEs DEP'T REG. 223.321:
"In order to determine if the father is the actual father of the child an intensive
investigation of the case is necessary. The mere allegation by the mother of the
child that a certain man is the father is not sufficient information upon which to
base an evaluation. Specific inquiry must be made of the mother regarding: (1)
the date of conception; (2) promiscuity; (3) frequency of contact with the puta-
tive father; (4) the names of any persons who could corroborate the relationship of
the mother and the putative father, and (5) specific facts establishing an act of
intercourse with the putative father at or near the date of conception."
41. Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969). See also Doe v.
Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302 (D. Conn. 1970). (Contempt proceeding against welfare
officials based on injunction issued in Doe v. Shapiro, where new regulation would
make the mother of an illegitimate child ineligible if she refused to cooperate.
The court held that the provision had the "same vice as the original. ... ) Id.
at 303.
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fusal to extend benefits in the circumstances recounted here is contrary to congres-
sional intent. Accordingly we hold that the challenged provisions of the Illinois
Department of Public Aid Categorical Assistance Manual are void and unenforce-
able.4 2
The defendant offered several plausible arguments which merit men-
tion. The defendant correctly stated that the Social Security Act directs
state welfare agencies to set standards by which "need" can be deter-
mined.43  Moreover, the states are compelled to weigh the income and
resources44 of any child in determining whether he is "needy" and thus
eligible for assistance. Since in Illinois, a putative father is a legally re-
sponsible relative, and thus at least a potential resource, the state can't
weigh the income and resources of a child unless it knows the identity and
financial position of the father.
The court rejected this argument for several reasons. First, the re-
cent Supreme Court decision of King v. Smith45 has held that the income
and resources provision of the Social Security Act excludes from considera-
tion any resource "merely assumed to be available."'46  Second, HEW's
official position is in accordance with the Smith rule:
(ii) in establishing financial eligibility and the amount of the assistance payment
(c) only such net income as is actually available for current use on a regular
basis will be considered, and only currently available resources will be consid-
ered. 47
Another argument proffered by the defendant and accepted by the dis-
sent48 was left unanswered by the court. The dissent asserted that the
Social Security Act authorizes state welfare agencies to develop support
for needy families from legally responsible relatives. This is a valid stat-
utory goal. The recent Supreme Court case of Wyman v. James,49 in
upholding New York's position that "home visitations" are a condition of
eligibility for AFDC, held that reasonable administrative tools enacted to
help achieve valid statutory goals are constitutional. Certainly, requiring
mothers applying for AFDC to name the putative father is a "reason-
able" tool which will help further the statutory objective of securing sup-
42. 332 F. Supp. 61, 63 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602, 603, 604 (1964, Supp. I11. 1967).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1964).
45. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
46. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 319 n.16 (1968). See Solman v. Shapiro,
300 F. Supp. 409 (D. Conn. 1969), aff'd per curiam 396 U.S. 5 (1969).
47. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii); 34 FED. REO. 1395 (1969). See also 42
U.S.C. § 402(a)(7).
48. 332 F. Supp. 64 (1971).
49. 400 U.S. 309 (1971); See Note, Wyman v. James, 4th Amendment-More
Restrictions on the Individual's Right to Privacy, 21 DEPAUL L. REv. 1081 (1972).
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port from legally responsible relatives. As stated above, the court did
not respond to this argument; indeed, it seems difficult to reconcile this de-
cision with the James case.
Although the court did not reach the constitutional issues and chose to
base its decision solely on statutory grounds, an interesting question is
presented when considering the Illinois NOLEO provision in light of
the constitutional right against self-incrimination. A welfare recipient's
fears are not groundless in this regard, for in filling out the form required
by the Illinois Department, she may be in danger of self-incrimination.
Had she provided the information requested by her caseworker, Ms. Doe
could have been prosecuted for fornication, adultery, or had her children
taken away from her in neglect proceedings. 50 The court in Doe v. Sha-
piro considered this problem and found that the Connecticut NOLEO pro-
vision posed a real threat to a welfare mother's fifth amendment rights,51
even in the face of a 1969 amendment to the Social Security Act which
required that states "provide safeguards which restrict the use or dis-
closure of information concerning applicants to purposes directly con-
nected with the administration of AFDC. '5 2 The court reasoned that since
the state department was required to pass the information on to the state
law enforcement officials,5 3 this provision providing for confidentiality
50. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23 §§ 2360-61; ch. 38 §§ 11-7, 11-8 (1967).
51. See State v. Plummer, 5 Conn. Cir. 35, 241 A.2d 198 (1967) (welfare
mother prosecuted for and convicted of lascivious carriage); Commonwealth v.
Lawrence, 1 Pov. L. Rep. 1310.10 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1967) (mother supplied in-
formation concerning her illegitimate child and signed criminal complaint against the
father as required by the mandatory paternity suit provision then existing in Mass-
achusetts. She was subsequently charged with lewd and lascivious cohabitation. The
court granted the motion to suppress all statements made to the police and dismissed
the suit on the grounds that the use of her statements violated her privilege against
self-incrimination).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(9) (1969).
53. ILL. REv. STATS. ch. 23 § 11-9 (1967) does not afford the recipient much
protection: Protection of Records-Exceptions. "For the protection of applicants
and recipients, the Illinois Department, the county departments and local govern-
mental units and local governmental units and their respective officers and employ-
ees are prohibited, except as hereinafter provided, from disclosing the contents of
any records, files, papers and communications, except for purposes directly con-
nected with the administration of public aid under this Code.
In any judicial proceeding, except a proceeding directly concerned with the ad-
ministration of programs provided for in this Code, or in which the applicant or
recipient is a party thereto, such records, files, papers and communication, and
their contents shall be deemed privileged communications. ...
This Section does not prevent the Illinois Department and local governmental
units from reporting to local appropriate law enforcement officials the desertion or
abandonment by a parent of a child, as a result of which financial aid has been
necessitated. . . . The Illinois Department may provide by rule for the county de-
partments and local governmental units to initiate proceedings under the "Juvenile
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might not be a bar, in certain circumstances, to the introduction, in a
criminal proceeding of evidence which was provided by the recipient.
Certainly these fears are not unreal when scrutinized in light of In re
Cager, 1 4 a class action by a group of Maryland welfare mothers, whose
children were being taken from them in criminal (later civil) neglect pro-
ceedings brought on information supplied by the recipients themselves, in
compliance with the state NOLEO disclosure requirement. The neglect
statute under consideration stated that in determining whether a child
should be removed from a home because it does not provide a stable
moral environment, the court should consider the following facts:
Whether the child's parent or guardian . .. (iv) is pregnant with an illegitimate
child; or (v) has, within a period of twelve months preceding the filing of a pe-
tition alleging the child to have been neglected, either been pregnant with, or given
birth to another child whose putative father she was not legally married to at the
time of conception, or has not thereafter married.
The circuit court ordered the children placed in foster homes. The court
of appeals reversed on the grounds that the birth of an illegitimate child
was not proof of neglect. The court did not hold that the state's
NOLEO requirement was violative of the mothers' fifth amendment
rights. It did suggest that "[u]ndoubtedly, a State's Attorney is to be
furnished Form 218 [the equivalent of the Illinois DPA-440, the
NOLEO reporting form] for the purpose of proceeding against absent
fathers, but [his] right is limited to the use of the form for [that] pur-
pose." 55
Ms. Doe asserted that in exercising her privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, she could not be penalized by being denied welfare benefits. 6
Court Act," approved August 5, 1965, to have children declared to be neglected
when they deem such action necessary to protect the children from immoral influ-
ences present in their home or surroundings." 36 PUBLIC AID IN ILLINOIS 11 (1969).
54. 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968).
55. Id. at 482, 248 A.2d at 390.
56. Compare Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 321-22 (1971): "What Mrs.
James appears to want from the agency that provides her and her infant son with
the necessities of life is the right to receive those necessities upon her own informa-
tional terms, to utilize the Fourth Amendment as a wedge for imposing those
terms, and to avoid questions of any kind .... ." [at 234] "It seems to us that the
situation is akin to that where an [IRS] agent, in making a routine civil audit of
a taxpayer's income tax return . .. asks that the taxpayer produce for the agent's
review some proof of a deduction the taxpayer has asserted to his benefit in the
computation of his tax. If the taxpayer refuses, there is, absent fraud, only a
disallowance of the claimed deduction and a consequent additional tax. The tax-
payer is fully within his 'rights' in refusing to produce the proof, but in maintaining
and asserting those rights a tax detriment results and it is a detriment of the tax-
payer's own making. So Mrs. James has the 'right' to refuse the home visit, but a
consequence in the form of cessation of aid, similar to the taxpayer's resultant
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It would seem that this conclusion would flow from several recent cases.
In Spevack v. Klien5 7 the Supreme Court held that an attorney could not
be disbarred for asserting his privilege against self-incrimination. The
Court cited Malloy v. Hogan,58 which defined that privilege to mean
"the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for
such silence." In this context, the Court said in Spevack, "'penalty'
is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means as we said in Griffin
v. California,59  . . . the imposition of any sanction which makes the as-
sertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly'." Certainly the denial of
welfare benefits is "costly" to the applicant/recipient who goes to the
public aid office usually as a last resort, with all possible alternatives for
support exhausted. 60
The court in Doe v. Swank held that the Illinois NOLEO requirement
was contrary to the intent of Congress. Even if the provision were au-
thorized by Congress and HEW it would probably be ruled unconstitu-
tional as violative of the recipient's fifth amendment rights. 61 It would
appear then that Illinois' attempts to investigate avenues of support by
conditioning welfare benefits on a mother's cooperation with public aid
officials have reached a judicial cul-de-sac. What alternatives, if any,
does the Illinois Department have in securing support from deserting
fathers without the statutory or constitutional infirmities of Manual
chapter 1259.1? Can the state avoid the backbreaking expense which it
alleged would be the result of the permanent injunction against the Illi-
nois NOLEO provisions? 6 2
additional tax, flows from that refusal. The choice is entirely hers, and nothing of
constitutional magnitude is involved."
57. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
58. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
59. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
60. 385 U.S. at 515; see also Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963)
(police coerce confession from welfare recipient by threatening that her public aid
would be cut off and her children taken away).
61. An interesting question not considered by the court was plaintiff's consti-
tutional right to maintain the integrity of her family. See Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497 (1961); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Certainly forcing
a woman to bastardize her child is as an important an area for the Court to inter-
vene as the area of birth control information (Griswold, Poe) or learning the
German language (Meyer). See KANTOWICZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFIN-
ISHED REVOLUTION (1969).
62. Appellant's jurisdictional statement at 44, Doe v. Weaver, 404 U.S. 987
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An alternative has been suggested which points out in vivid detail the
dilemma which Illinois is faced with. It would increase support from
deserting fathers but would have other, less ameliorative effects as well.
Under the plan, law enforcement officers (the State's Attorney's office
in Cook County, the Attorney General in all other counties) would ini-
tiate prosecutions of mothers of all illegitimate children applying for or re-
ceiving public aid for fornication or adultery. The mother would be
granted immunity, and would be required to testify as to the name, ad-
dress, and place of employment of her paramour/co-misdemeanant. If
the mother refused to cooperate she would be jailed for contempt of court.
The objectionable feature of this plan is obvious-the wholesale jailing
of welfare mothers would certainly be a volatile procedure, one not
calculated to match the political expediencies of two politically sensitive
offices. Any attempts by the Department to coerce welfare recipients by
traditional legal means always results in a dilemma: you cannot fine
someone on welfare, he's poor to begin with, and you cannot jail moth-
ers with children. 63 Unless a state legislator is prepared to emulate the po-
litical career of Attila the Hun, he had better search out new methods of
legal enforcement in welfare situations.
The states may not be forced to find their own solutions, however,
since the question will be made moot by the passage of President Nixon's
Family Assistance Plan (FAP). The measure, as originally proposed, 64
would delete the requirement of the present Social Security Act, that
states notify law enforcement officials whenever aid is furnished to a child
who has been deserted or abandoned by a parent.65  The deletion of this
notice requirement would deprive the states of any justification for condi-
(1971). The Illinois Department estimates that the injunction against MANUAL
provision 1259.1 (set out in note 2, supra) would cost $20 to $30 million in retro-
active payments added to the total expense of the AFDC program during fiscal
1972.
63. See In re Carradine, 72 C 2874 (N.D. Ill. filed 11-15-72) (welfare mother
sentenced to 6 months in jail for contempt of court for her refusal to testify in a
murder trial). Mrs. Carradine was pardoned by Governor Ogilvie on Dec. 7, 1972.
64. Family Assistance Act of 1970, H.R. 16311, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
The bill failed to pass the Senate. It was resurrected as the Social Security Amend-
ments of 1972, H.R. 1, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) but failed to be reported out of
committee in the Senate. See 118 Cong. Rec. S-16509 (daily edition October 2,
1972) (The exchange between Senators Long and Pastore is enlightening with regard
to present Senate attitudes toward legislation aimed at securing support.) Congress
seems to have come full circle in this matter-a bill was submitted which would
make it a federal crime, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 and/or im-
prisonment for one year to move or travel in interstate or foreign commerce to
avoid compliance with a support order. H.R. 17329, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
65. H.R. 16311, supra, § 103(b)(1)(G) (1970).
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tioning eligibility on disclosure requirements. The plan sets up a full
range of federal eligibility requirements, which are to be exclusive of any
other criteria. Under FAP, the states would have to implement the fed-
eral scheme without adding any requirements of their own. But under
the Plan, even as amended, the states would continue to have the respon-
sibility to secure support for needy children.66 They cannot require co-
operation from recipients, but they must get support from responsible
relatives or face bankruptcy.
Illinois will not be able to look to FAP for the solution to its problem
regarding support from absent parents. This problem is at the heart of
the so-called welfare crisis, because throughout the years, the major rea-
son families have applied for public assistance has been loss of support
when the father left home.67 Approximately one half of the cases receiv-
ing AFDC in Illinois during the past six years have included one or more
illegitimate children. 8 As of June, 1971, only 6.8 percent of the AFDC
cases in Illinois were receiving contributions from parents-and those
contributions equaled only 1.5 percent of the total needs of the AFDC
caseload.69 FAP would completely ignore this problem, and leave this
responsibility with the states. The Illinois Attorney General does not have
the manpower to establish the paternity of the approximately 139,725
children born out of wedlock receiving AFDC in April, 197 170-but that
is the situation in which the decision in Doe v. Swank leaves Illinois.
If there is a solution, for Illinois and other states, to this intricate problem,
it lies with Congress.
Michael J. Morrissey
66. The present 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(17) (see note 28, supra) is preserved in
its entirety in FAP as § 402(a)(11).
67. See 36 PUBLIC AD IN ILLINOIs 4, 27 (1969).
68. See 38 PUBLIC AID IN ILLINOIS 28 (table 5) (1971).
69. Id. at 30, table 9.
70. Appellant's jurisdictional statement, supra note 79, at 54.
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